From Comparative Advantage to Coercive Trade: The New US Economic Strategy

Recently, Marcelo Ebrard, Mexico’s Secretary of Economy and lead negotiator with the United States on tariffs imposed by former President Trump, made an observation during a televised interview. He noted that international trade is shifting from being governed by comparative advantages to being shaped by comparative disadvantages. n nDavid Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, as outlined in the book “International Economics: Theory and Policy” by Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld (2001), explains that countries trade out of necessity and mutual benefit. In this framework, nations import goods that are difficult or expensive to produce domestically and export products where they have higher productivity. This model has historically promoted global efficiency, economic interdependence, and mutual development. n nFor over two centuries, the principle of comparative advantage formed the foundation of global trade. However, as Ebrard pointed out, this concept is increasingly undermined by protectionist policies, particularly those introduced by the Trump administration. These developments signal a shift from a system driven by economic logic to one where trade decisions often contradict traditional efficiency principles. In this new paradigm, the question is no longer whether a country is an ally or adversary, but whether it complies with the conditions set by the United States to access its market. n nThis transformation cannot be understood without considering the global changes over the past 34 years. At the end of the Cold War, the United States was not only the largest economy, accounting for 22% of global GDP (in purchasing power parity, or PPP), but also held unmatched military power, with presence in over 70 countries and more than 800 overseas bases. It dominated the international financial system through the U.S. dollar, set global trade rules, and offered market access as the anchor of the global economy. However, the rise of new powers—particularly China—and the consolidation of blocs like the European Union have reduced America’s relative influence. By 2024, the U.S. share of global GDP (in PPP terms) had fallen below 15%. n nChina, which accounted for only 3.6% of global GDP in 1990, now contributes over 19% and leads in strategic sectors such as advanced manufacturing (electric vehicle batteries, renewable energy, industrial robotics), artificial intelligence, digital finance, electronic payments, and electric vehicles. The European Union, despite internal challenges, maintains a global economic footprint comparable to that of the United States and remains a major regulatory and commercial force. n nIn response to this evolving landscape, the United States under Trump chose to redefine its global influence not through economic efficiency, but through economic pressure. The tariff policies introduced by the administration clearly reflect this shift. Tariffs are no longer imposed solely to protect inefficient industries, but to force foreign firms and governments to relocate investments, align decisions with U.S. interests, or pay a political price for market access. In this framework, comparative advantage is discarded—what matters is not whether another country can produce more cheaply, but whether it serves U.S. strategic interests to maintain industrial dominance. n nThis marks a departure from the core principles of free trade, as the U.S. seeks to regain industrial control, reduce reliance on strategic rivals, and condition access to its market. This is not an isolated or improvised policy, but a structural response to the rise of competing powers—especially China—and the fragmentation of the international order that the U.S. has led since 1945. n nIt can be argued that the era of comparative advantage has come to an end. Today, politics increasingly dictates economic outcomes, and trade has become a battleground among global powers. n nNote: When making international comparisons, GDP in PPP terms is preferred over nominal GDP. Nominal GDP can be distorted by exchange rate fluctuations, while PPP adjusts for differences in cost of living.

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