Approximately one year from now, the current agreement between the Egyptian government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will conclude, sparking debate over whether authorities will seek another arrangement with the institution. While Prime Minister Dr. Mostafa Madbouly has repeatedly stated that there are no plans to return to the IMF, he emphasized that a domestically designed economic initiative is expected to address additional structural challenges within the economy.
Over the past decade, Egyptian citizens have shouldered the burden of economic reforms, particularly through rising living costs and increased social pressures. Despite some macroeconomic improvements, tangible benefits for households remain limited. Many continue to face financial strain, especially due to debt servicing obligations—both domestic and foreign—that consume significant portions of public spending.
A key question persists: how long must people wait for visible improvements in daily life, such as better employment opportunities, affordable goods, and enhanced healthcare and education services?
In a recent dialogue hosted by the Economists Editors’ Syndicate, former Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Ziad Bahaa El-Din offered insights into these challenges. He noted that while the 2016 IMF program was implemented during one of Egypt’s most difficult economic periods—marked by currency market instability, a sharp devaluation of the pound against the dollar, and dwindling foreign currency inflows—it did not resolve all structural issues. Some areas worsened, others improved, but the program arguably helped avoid a deeper crisis.
There is broad consensus that the IMF’s focus was primarily on stabilizing macroeconomic indicators, which do not directly translate into progress in social sectors like housing affordability, education, or public health—areas where citizens have felt mounting pressure.
Experts including Dr. Bahaa El-Din argue that the government, as the architect of domestic policy, bears responsibility for the social costs stemming from reform implementation. The absence of complementary programs to cushion the impact of currency adjustments and subsidy reductions placed disproportionate burdens on ordinary people, who remain the most vulnerable in this cycle.
On the revenue side, state foreign exchange resources have grown through various channels: IMF financing, asset sales such as the Ras El-Hekma deal, worker remittances, loans from the European Union, the World Bank, and Arab countries. While these inflows are partly linked to the IMF agreement, they come at a cost. The IMF does not mandate broad economic transformation, and some believe a locally tailored alternative could have achieved similar results with less hardship for citizens. Egypt, after all, is a member of the IMF and retains negotiating flexibility.
Although the government fulfilled most IMF conditions—such as exchange rate liberalization, fuel and electricity price adjustments, and partial tax reforms—a major hurdle remains: the state’s disengagement from public enterprises and economic agencies. Progress on privatization and reducing public sector dominance has been slow.
Was the IMF program necessary? According to Dr. Bahaa El-Din, even critics agree that having a structured plan was better than none. However, differences lie in execution, supporting measures, and decision-making prudence. Given the sacrifices already made, completing the reform path consistently may be preferable to abrupt shifts.
What comes after the IMF? This critical question demands creative thinking, national dialogue, and strategic planning. A homegrown economic agenda should prioritize areas outside the IMF’s scope—those reflecting real public needs. Such a program would emphasize sustainable job creation, wage improvements, productivity gains, export expansion, and clearer roles for both private enterprise and the state. It must also involve cautious and deliberate steps in reducing government involvement in the economy.
Ultimately, launching a widely supported national economic strategy depends on political will—the essential foundation for fulfilling people’s aspirations across farms, factories, shops, streets, and universities. A truly independent plan, free from external mandates focused solely on fiscal metrics, would demonstrate genuine commitment to moving beyond reliance on international financial institutions.
— news from جريدة الأهالي المصرية
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After IMF Agreement, Focus Shifts to National Economic Program in Egypt
After approximately one year, the agreement signed between the government and the International Monetary Fund will end, yet debate continues and expectations vary regarding whether the government will turn again to the fund for a new agreement or not.
Perhaps there are no guarantees that the years of dependency on the IMF will end, despite Prime Minister Dr. Mostafa Madbouly confirming more than once that the government will not resort to the IMF, pointing out that it is expected that the government will implement an Egyptian program to address other aspects in the economic sector.
Over nearly ten years, the Egyptian citizen has borne the cost of economic reform and all its repercussions, especially concerning rising living costs and various social burdens, and the direct positive outcome has remained limited, and will continue to bear many burdens, especially those resulting from debt service impacts, external and internal.
But the question remains awaiting an answer: “How long will the citizen continue waiting for tangible results affecting their daily life, especially in job opportunities, providing goods at suitable and acceptable prices, greater attention to health and education, and other sectors and services in their daily life?”
In an important dialogue between Dr. Ziad Bahaa El-Din, former Deputy Prime Minister, and journalists within their syndicate, by invitation and organization from the Economists Editors Division, Dr. Ziad attempted to answer many questions from his perspective.
What has been lost has been accomplished; the government implemented the IMF’s vision, which in the view of some was a necessity, as it coincided at its beginning in 2016 with the worst periods of Egypt’s economy, especially strikes in the foreign exchange market, a state of runaway in the price of the pound against the dollar and foreign currencies, absence of any inflow of resources to cover imported market needs, and no local alternative for them, even the absence of Egyptians’ transfers abroad, allowing the black market to dominate.
Under these circumstances, the same question was raised: what is the solution? Thus came the fastest answer: implementing a program with the International Monetary Fund in 2016. From the viewpoint of some, including Dr. Ziad Bahaa El-Din, the program did not address all issues—some worsened, others improved—and perhaps contributed to overcoming a moment of danger.
There is general agreement that the IMF program addressed the overall financial indicators of the national economy, which are not at all related to developing and improving health, education, and social issues, including housing prices, which the citizen felt through escalating burdens.
Therefore, the government, as responsible for internal policies, is the one that caused or bears responsibility for the problems arising from the economic reform program with the fund—according to experts and observers including Dr. Ziad Bahaa El-Din—due to the absence of programs dealing with the burdens of reforming overall and financial indicators such as exchange rates and others. Despite signing another agreement with the fund, burdens continued to fall on the citizen, considered the weakest element in this endless circle.
Conversely, state resources in foreign currency have increased from various sources, including IMF financing, the sale of Ras El-Hekma, workers’ remittances abroad, loans from the European Union, the World Bank, and Arab countries. There is a link between this inflow and the IMF agreement, and this has a price, as the fund’s role does not include general economic reform, and perhaps some believe the fund’s program was not necessary and a local program could have been applied at a lower cost than what the citizen paid. Freedom in agreement with the fund is available, despite Egypt being a partner in the IMF.
While the government implemented most of the IMF program’s conditions, including exchange rate liberalization, moving fuel and electricity prices, and partial tax reform, the current obstacle relates to the state’s exit program from public companies, economic sectors, and agencies.
Here arises the question: was the program a necessity? From Dr. Ziad’s perspective, among those agreeing and disagreeing on fund programs, having a program is better than having none, but the difference lies in applications, supportive clauses, rationality in decisions, and even the gain that since the program was carried out, completing it continuously is better after citizens have paid the price.
But what comes after the fund? An important question requiring sharpened ideas, brainstorming, and national dialogue to define future visions through a national program focusing on issues not of interest to the IMF—those reflecting people’s needs—and providing financial commitments to address and improve them, including health, treatment, education, rationalization, and caution in the state’s exit and withdrawal from the economy, working on sustainable jobs, improving wages, increasing production, increasing exports, building a clearly defined role relationship between the private sector and government, and others.
It is certain that achieving an economically agreed-upon program depends on political will, as it is the main guarantee for achieving people’s desires and aspirations in fields, factories, stores, markets, streets, students in universities, and scientific institutions—a program not dictated by parties whose interests do not include people’s concerns, and for the government to be sincere in not signing further agreements with the fund.