The U.S. Department of Justice has achieved a historic milestone with the conviction of Linwei Ding, a 38-year-old former Google software engineer and Chinese national, on 14 counts related to economic espionage and theft of trade secrets. On January 30, Ding was found guilty of stealing proprietary artificial intelligence technologies developed at Google, including critical information about tensor processing units, graphics processing units, and network interface cards—components vital for training and operating advanced AI systems. The case, prosecuted in the Northern District of California, marks the first successful federal prosecution involving AI-related industrial spying linked to China.
Evidence presented during the trial revealed that Ding maintained ties with Chinese government-backed talent recruitment programs and intended to transfer stolen designs to state-affiliated entities in China. He had established a company in China focused on building high-performance computing clusters and applied for a Shanghai-based government-sponsored initiative aimed at strengthening the nation’s supercomputing capabilities. His actions align with broader efforts by Beijing to accelerate domestic technological advancement by acquiring sensitive U.S.-developed innovations.
The conviction underscores the challenges posed by export controls on advanced semiconductor technologies, which have limited China’s access to cutting-edge chips. In response, Chinese institutions have increasingly sought alternative pathways to obtain U.S. know-how, particularly in areas critical to AI development. Google’s internal monitoring systems, including digital activity logs and physical safeguards, did not stop the initial data exfiltration but provided crucial evidence that enabled federal investigators to build a strong case.
This outcome may set a precedent for future enforcement actions targeting foreign attempts to exploit American research and development. It also emphasizes the importance of collaboration between tech firms and federal agencies in identifying and mitigating intellectual property theft. Experts suggest that increased scrutiny is needed across federal funding bodies like the National Science Foundation to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive technologies by foreign-linked organizations. Strengthening enforcement within the Bureau of Industry and Security could further bolster U.S. defenses against technology transfer violations.
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Justice Department Marks First Successful Prosecution of Chinese AI-Related Economic Espionage
Despite his efforts to flee the United States, the law finally caught up with Linwei Ding.
On January 30, the Department of Justice convicted 38-year-old Ding, a former Google software engineer and Chinese national, on 14 counts of economic espionage and trade-related theft for stealing artificial intelligence (AI) technologies on behalf of the Chinese government. The case, which began after prosecutors indicted Ding in 2024 in the Northern District of California, is the department’s first-ever conviction on economic espionage charges related to AI.
The case, which highlights Beijing’s ongoing effort to steal American technologies, marks a major success in prosecuting such conduct and conceivably offer a roadmap for future enforcement efforts.
Former Google Engineer Had Ties to Chinese Talent Acquisition Program
According to the jury’s decision, Ding stole information related to Google’s tensor and graphic processing units as well as the firm’s network interface cards, each of which are essential for training and deploying advanced AI models. During his employment with Google, Ding also maintained access to software products that enhanced the efficiency of GPUs, a technology which allows AI models to use fewer chips.
The court also revealed that Ding had worked with Chinese talent acquisition programs with the aim of delivering Google’s technology to Chinese state-controlled firms. Having founded a separate Chinese firm building computing clusters to accelerate AI development, Ding had planned to sell Google’s designs to government agencies and academic institutions while applying to a Shanghai-based government sponsored “talent plan” to assist in developing the country’s supercomputing infrastructure.
China Targets Export-Controlled Technologies
The case highlights China’s ongoing efforts to develop its own domestic computing infrastructure by exploiting U.S. advances in AI to surpass it. While Chinese firms have developed high-quality AI models using a combination of domestic and foreign components, Chinese industry leaders have noted that their progress has stalled because of a shortage of advanced chips due to export controls. This shortage has driven attempts by Chinese firms and academic institutions to gain access to U.S. supercomputing resources. It also has direct implications on Ding’s case, as his work involved the types of computing systems Chinese firms could use to overcome persistent hardware gaps.
The conviction also illustrates the importance of cooperation between federal law enforcement and the private sector in combatting foreign espionage. While Google’s reported security measures, which included network activity logging and physical security measures, did not prevent the initial theft, the firm’s tracking efforts provided investigators with enough evidence to file economic espionage charges. The conviction may also mark a turning point in federal prosecutions of Chinese economic espionage, which often have lower records of success than other prosecutions under similar statutes due to complications over proving defendants’s intent to directly benefit Beijing.
Washington Should Pursue Additional Investigations Into Chinese Espionage
Along with showcasing China’s efforts to circumvent U.S. export controls through economic espionage, the conviction should convince federal prosecutors to increase their focus on such cases as part of a broader effort to safeguard sensitive American technologies.
These measures should complement greater enforcement activity across the federal government. The Bureau of Industry and Security should bolster its enforcement of export controls, an effort that will require both additional funding from Congress and additional personnel to conduct investigations. Federal grant-writing agencies, such as the National Science Foundation, should also increase their scrutiny of potential Chinese firms and institutions accessing U.S. technologies, particularly those related to developing AI.