China-Latin America and Caribbean Economic Ties Strengthen in 2024, Focus Shifts to Sustainability

In 2024, economic interactions between China and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) deepened, with notable expansion in renewable energy, electric mobility, and minerals critical to the global energy shift. Despite this progress, traditional sectors such as agriculture and mining still account for the bulk of bilateral trade and are expected to remain central to trans-Pacific economic dynamics.

Rebecca Ray and Enrique Dussel Peters present these insights in the 2025 edition of the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Economic Bulletin, a resource designed to clarify the evolving economic landscape between the regions, where reliable data is often scarce.

Key observations include a moderate decline in LAC exports to China, which reached $190.9 billion, while Chinese shipments to the region climbed to an estimated $286.7 billion. As a result, the trade imbalance widened, reaching 1.4 percent of the region’s GDP—the highest on record. China now accounts for 13 percent of LAC’s total exports and 22 percent of its imports.

Raw materials continue to dominate LAC’s export basket to China. Notably, unprocessed copper ores and concentrates have gained prominence, overtaking refined copper products. Frozen beef has also risen in significance, displacing refined copper as the fifth-largest export commodity in the trade corridor.

Chinese involvement in infrastructure development across LAC surged over the past five years, increasing by more than 50 percent compared to the prior half-decade. Transportation infrastructure has now surpassed energy projects as the primary focus of Chinese contractors in the region.

Although overall Chinese outward direct investment (ODI) showed a slight slowdown from 2020 to 2024, investments linked to climate action expanded rapidly. In the mining sector, particularly for transition minerals essential to clean energy technologies, Chinese ODI more than doubled. Among energy-related investments, wind and solar power projects grew by over half. In automotive manufacturing, funding has increasingly supported electric vehicle production or hybrid models, moving away from reliance on internal combustion engines.

China’s overseas development finance (ODF), channeled through the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM), reached $2.8 billion in 2024—the highest level in five years. This marks a recovery to pre-pandemic levels, though it remains below the peak seen a decade earlier.

Since 2020, nearly all Chinese ODF in LAC has been directed toward financial institutions, particularly national development banks in countries like Brazil, rather than individual infrastructure ventures. This strategic shift empowers local entities to manage project selection and supervision.

Emerging patterns highlight a growing emphasis on sustainable development in policy dialogues between China and LAC nations. Looking ahead, key challenges will involve aligning agricultural practices with environmental goals and building resilient renewable energy supply chains. Given the heavy concentration in a few sectors, trade frictions have increased. The authors stress that mutual cooperation and political commitment will be vital in shaping a balanced and forward-looking partnership.

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China-Latin America and the Caribbean Economic Bulletin, 2025 Edition

In 2024, China’s relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) continued to grow, especially in the emerging sectors of renewable energy, energy transition minerals and electric mobility. However, lower-technology sectors such as agriculture and mining continued to dominate trade and are likely to continue their prominent role in trans-Pacific relations.

Rebecca Ray and Enrique Dussel Peters identify these findings in the 2025 edition of the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Economic Bulletin. The report is designed to provide analysts and observers a reference to the ever-changing landscape of China-LAC economic relations—where data is often not readily accessible.

Main findings:

In 2024, LAC exports to China fell moderately to $190.9 billion, while Chinese exports to LAC grew significantly to an estimated $286.7 billion. Thus, LAC’s trade deficit with China rose to a record 1.4 percent of regional GDP; China now represents 13 percent of LAC’s exports and 22 percent of the region’s imports.

Among LAC’s top exports to China, raw materials predominate and have grown even more important. For example, refined copper products have declined in importance while unrefined copper ores and concentrates have grown dramatically. Furthermore, frozen beef has grown in importance and replaced refined copper as the fifth most important LAC-China export commodity.

Chinese contractors’ participation in LAC infrastructure projects has increased dramatically in the last five years, rising by over 50 percent compared to the previous five years. In particular, Chinese firms’ provision of transportation infrastructure has grown to displace energy as the most important sector.

Chinese outbound slowed slightly from 2020-2024 compared to the previous five years. Nevertheless, Chinese OFDI in sectors associated with climate change has grown rapidly. Within the mining, minerals and metals sector in producing transition minerals (those minerals associated with the global energy transition), Chinese OFDI has more than doubled. Among energy OFDI projects, wind and solar power generation has grown by more than 50 percent. Finally, within automotive manufacturing, most Chinese OFDI has supported manufacturing electric vehicles or a mix of electric and internal combustion rather than simply internal combustion vehicles.

Chinese overseas development finance (ODF)—sovereign finance from China’s two development finance institutions (DFIs), the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM)—rose to $2.8 billion in 2024, representing the highest level in five years. It is now roughly on par with the levels just before the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak and well below its peak years from a decade ago.

Since 2020, almost all of China’s ODF in LAC has gone to the finance and financial intermediaries sector, supporting national development banks in LAC (and particularly Brazil) rather than specific projects. This pivot gives national institutions the role of project selection and oversight.

Recent trends signal the centrality of sustainability in the China-LAC policy engagement. The coming years will determine the important questions of how China and LAC governments can pursue sustainable development together in these agricultural sector as well as in plans to develop renewable energy supply chains. Because of the high concentration in these few sectors, the relationship has encountered increasing trade tensions. The authors argue that the ability and willingness of leaders on both sides of the Pacific to continue working together toward shared development goals will be crucial in the relationship’s future.

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