Lu Dadao, a prominent Chinese economic geographer and academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, has issued a detailed critique of China’s high-speed rail (HSR) development. He argues that the country has significantly overinvested in HSR infrastructure, leading to financial inefficiencies and questionable returns.
According to Lu, the rapid expansion of HSR began during the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), when transportation investment reached an unusually high 7–9% of GDP. Annual investment in transport infrastructure peaked at nearly 3 trillion yuan between 2008 and 2010, with 700 billion yuan allocated to HSR alone in 2009. This aggressive expansion continued through the 12th and 13th Five-Year Plans, pushing the total HSR network to over 46,000 kilometers by early 2025.
Lu highlights that while HSR offers significant advantages in speed and efficiency, its high construction and maintenance costs require substantial passenger demand to justify investment. He notes that HSR lines operating at 350 km/h should only be built between major cities with annual passenger flows exceeding 25 million, or serving critical national transport functions. Many existing lines, however, fail to meet these criteria, leading to underutilization and financial losses.
The article also points to governance issues, including corruption and poor planning during the tenure of former Railway Minister Liu Zhijun. Despite reforms in 2013 and a policy shift in 2022 to curb excessive HSR construction, many regions have continued to invest in short-distance HSR lines around major cities, further exacerbating inefficiencies.
Lu emphasizes the need for a more balanced transportation strategy that integrates HSR with conventional railways, highways, and urban transit systems. He warns that the current approach risks turning national planning into a farce, with unnecessary lines built to meet political targets rather than actual demand.
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China massively overbuilt high-speed rail, says leading economic geographer
What you are about to read is a lengthy, comprehensive, sharp — and at times even indignant — criticism of China’s high-speed rail development by one of the country’s leading official economic geographers recently.
Lu Dadao, born in 1940, is an Academician of the state-run Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), one of the highest honors bestowed upon a scientist in China. The title is often described as the pinnacle of scientific achievement and social prestige within the Chinese academic and research community.
According to his official biography at the CAS’s Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Lu, President of the Geographic Society of China between 1999 and 2010, was a participant in the drafting of China’s “National Master Plan for Land Use” led by then State Planning Commission, the predecessor of today’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and organized and contributed to the formulation of major national-level plans such as the “Land Use Plan for the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan Region” and the “Economic Development Plan for the Bohai Rim Region,” as well as numerous other development strategy studies and planning projects. He has also led or participated in drafting a large number of reports and policy recommendations on national land development, regional development, and governance. Among these, nine reports were submitted by the CAS to the State Council. He has also been involved in drafting major plans and reports for then State Planning Commission on more than ten occasions.
Lu has long warned about the risks of highway, railway, and airport overbuilding in China. In 2010, Lu headed a team of government researchers that issued a report criticizing the nation ‘s vast transportation-building program for excessive investment. In 2011, he told Caixin, China’s leading business media outlet, in an interview reprinted by the Wall Street Journal, that he “faced great pressure” from officials unhappy with the report.
In 2013, Lu was among the experts who briefed China’s then Premier on urbanisation.
What is he now saying about China’s high-speed rail (HSR)? The following article was published on June 15, 2025, in the WeChat blog called China National Conditions and Development Forum, which describes itself as jointly initiated in 2018 by the Bureau of Academic Divisions and the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research of the CAS.
高铁辉煌，高铁问题如何了？
The Glory of High Speed Rail: What About Its Problems?
I. Introduction: Wave after wave of High-Speed Rail (HSR) development in China
Over the past four decades of reform and opening up, the Party and the government have attached great importance to the development of transportation infrastructure. Today, China commands a vast, integrated and largely modernised transport network: high-capacity passenger and freight corridors span the country; its merchant fleet plies every major sea lane; and its airlines serve destinations worldwide. Bottlenecks that once plagued key routes—between border regions, between Beijing and Shanghai, between the Pearl River Delta and the southwest (Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou), and between the Yangtze River Delta and the northwest—have been substantially eased. The mainline railway network linking the nation’s heartland with the southwest, northwest and northern frontiers, while meeting national-defence needs, is essentially complete. In terms of capacity, layout and geographic reach, this system has strongly supported the rapid development of China’s economy and society. The old saying that “to travel is to suffer” has, for most people, become a thing of the past.
China’s capacity to research, develop and manufacture transport equipment is now formidable, and management across the sector continues to improve. By international safety metrics and in the public’s own sense of safety, China is now comparable to some Western countries. Numerous engineers, technicians and construction crews have shown exceptional grit and dedication, conquering soaring mountains and deep gorges, broad rivers, glaciers, permafrost, and deserts, to create a host of engineering miracles.
However, it is also known that the transportation sector, as a major national industry, has received substantial financial investment from the state at various stages. While remarkable achievements have been made, this progress has come at a significant cost. Particularly in the latter half of the 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010), the government launched an ultra-large-scale transportation planning and construction campaign that drove transport investment to an exceptional 7–9% of GDP. This is an unusually high ratio. Between 2008 and 2010, annual transportation investment sharply increased to nearly 3 trillion yuan. In 2009 alone, national investment in HSRs reached 700 billion yuan. This situation persisted for several years, leading to a serious bout of overbuilding.
The following discussion will specifically address the issues arising in China’s HSR planning and construction from the perspectives of rationality and economy.
During the latter part of the 11th Five-Year Plan, specifically, in 2009, China adopted the Mid-to-Long Term Railway Network Plan. It envisioned building a “four-vertical, four-horizontal” grid of passenger-dedicated lines and an intercity express network, creating fast-travel corridors that link provincial capitals and large and medium-sized cities.
However, industry regulators announced that the “four-vertical, four-horizontal” grid would be finished within three to five years, aiming to “lead China fully into the HSR era.” Construction of 250 km/h Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) lines surged, and the launch of the Beijing–Tianjin route triggered a nationwide rollout of 350 km/h long-distance corridors. By 2012, the network already spanned 18,000 km. Conventional K-series express trains were steadily replaced by EMUs, followed quickly by the grand entry of the HSR era.
The 2011 corruption enquiry of the railway minister exposed deep-seated corruption and poor workmanship in China’s HSR programme. That year, projects worth about one trillion yuan were paused. Yet many ills of Liu Zhijun’s tenure—dubious approvals, reckless timelines, and a web of unwritten rules and backroom deals—were never fully brought to light. Waste and accidents on the ground received only superficial investigation.
Even so, during the 12th and 13th Five-Year Plans (2011-2020), the “Great Leap Forward” of China’s HSR resumed to popular applause. Ambitions for long-distance, intercity and suburban high-speed lines in major cities stayed far too grand, and mega-projects sped through approval. In ten years, the network added another 20,000 km, reaching 37,900 km by the end of the 13th Plan and, by early 2025, is set to hit 46,000 km. The “four-vertical, four-horizontal” grid finished ahead of schedule, while an even denser “eight-vertical, eight-horizontal” network was taking shape.
In August 2021, China Railway Group Limited released the Outline of the Railway-First Strategy for Building a Strong Transportation Nation in the New Era, setting a target of 70,000 km of HSR by 2035—nearly double the mileage in 2022. The consequence of this unrelenting drive for speed is becoming increasingly clear.
Although the “railway head” (the Ministry of Railways) was overhauled in 2013, with construction and operations restructured under China Railway Corporation [which was restructured into China Railway Group Limited in 2019], the newly minted “railway boss” continued to act with overbearing confidence and blatant disregard for national economic trends, market demand, and public sentiment. The target of 70,000 km of HSR by 2035 was a staggering all-or-nothing gamble.
However, just six months later, in March 2022, the state finally issued the Opinions on Improving Railway Planning and Construction, which effectively applied the “emergency brake” to the nationwide HSR “Great Leap Forward.” For reference, the front-page report of the Economic Daily on April 18, 2022, outlined numerous serious problems in HSR planning and construction over the past decade. [We have been unable to locate this report. —Translators’ note] Since then, construction of medium- and long-distance HSR across the country has essentially come to a halt.
However, immediately afterwards, various regions turned to aggressively developing short-distance HSR, centred around megacities and large cities, connecting areas within a 100 to 200-kilometre radius. The economic losses continued to expand and extend across China’s vast territory.
Former Minister of Railways Liu Zhijun, who held office for eight years, and former general manager of China Railway Corporation Sheng Guangzu, who served for six years, were the two most prominent figures implicated in railway-related corruption. Li Zaiyong from Guizhou [former vice chairman of the Guizhou Provincial Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference] is another key figure. Both Liu and Sheng were directly or indirectly involved in a wide range of misconduct, spanning project approvals and contracting, construction quality, equipment and material standards, and overall governance. Projects that should never have been approved were nonetheless launched; irrational and even illegal ventures were pushed through; and substandard materials and workmanship were overlooked. Bribery and graft lay at the root of these failures, while the exposure and concealment of quality problems were the consequences. The causal chain is clear.
This article attempts to tackle all these issues, albeit from a peripheral angle, and can only expose a fraction of the full picture.
II. What Is HSR?
What is HSR? It stands for high-speed rail. Compared with conventional railways, HSR differs in several fundamental ways.
First, the faster the train, the larger the required curve radius of the railway line. For example, a high-speed rail line operating at 350 km/h requires a minimum curve radius of about 6,000 metres. By contrast, a line designed for 200 km/h can manage with a radius of around 3,500 metres, while conventional railways in China—designed for speeds up to 120 km/h—require only about 600 metres.
Moreover, higher speeds demand gentler gradients, meaning HSR routes must be “straight and flat.” In mountainous or uneven terrain, this necessitates extensive tunnelling and bridge construction, resulting in massive volumes of earthwork and engineering effort.
Second, higher speeds demand stronger and higher-grade materials for the subgrade, track bed, and rails. High-speed rail requires rails weighing up to 75 kilograms per metre. By contrast, conventional railways typically use rails weighing between 45 and 55 kilograms per metre, while suburban light rail systems may use rails as light as 30 kilograms per metre.
Third, the railway switches used in HSR systems, as well as the train wheels, require specialised materials and advanced manufacturing techniques. At present, these components are still likely dependent on imports.
Fourth, the maintenance costs of HSR lines, including stations, are significantly higher than those of conventional railways. According to the World Bank’s Implementation Completion and Results Reports on six Chinese HSR projects (designed for speeds of 250 km/h) published before 2010, the annual maintenance cost is approximately 1 million yuan per route-km.
Fifth, dedicated to speed, HSR handles exclusively passenger transport. In some countries, on a few mainlines where trains operate at around 200 km/h, such as in Germany, certain mainlines with operating speeds around 200 km/h are classified as high-speed rail and still accommodate both passenger and freight trains. In China, however, lines designed for speeds of 250 km/h and above do not carry freight traffic.
Sixth, on the construction costs of China’s HSR network: In the early 2000s, China launched the development of several EMU lines designed for speeds of 250 km/h. At the time, construction in the eastern plains region of China cost approximately 80 to 100 million yuan per route-km, while in low mountainous and hilly areas, the figure rose to about 150 million yuan.
During the 12th Five-Year Plan period, large-scale construction of 350 km/h lines began. In the eastern plains, costs climbed to around 200 million yuan per route-km, rising to approximately 300 million yuan in hilly regions. In some mountainous areas of the southwest, costs reached as high as 400 to 500 million yuan per route-km.
By comparison, under similar conditions, conventional railways—electrified double-track lines with a maximum design speed of 160 km/h—cost only 50 to 60% as much. All figures are based on prices at the time. As I lack access to primary data, these numbers should be understood as indicative rather than precise.
The high construction and relatively higher maintenance costs of HSR form the fundamental basis for evaluating the rationality of China’s land-based rail transit hierarchy and the feasibility of individual lines.
III. On the planning and construction of China’s HSR
(1) Fundamental principles to be followed in designing China’s HSR network
I summarise the following key points:
HSR construction is generally reasonable between megacities that possess large-scale passenger flow distribution. Examples include the Beijing–Shanghai, the Beijing–Guangzhou (including Beijing–Hong Kong), and the Beijing–Shenyang lines.
Even if the endpoints of a line are not major passenger hubs or top-tier national megacities, it is still justifiable to construct an HSR if it links several cities, each with a population of over one million, within a relatively short distance.
Special circumstances may also justify construction, for example, 250 km/h HSRs linking Beijing, the national capital, or Shanghai, the country’s largest economic centre, with key cities in ethnic minority regions or strategically important border areas.
Within China’s three major city clusters—the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta—and possibly the Chengdu-Chongqing cluster as well, both internal and national (including transit) passenger flows exist. Internally, between core cities and their surrounding areas, light rail is generally sufficient to meet commuting demand—the primary reason for building railways—as well as commercial and socio-cultural travel needs. If passenger flows originate from or are destined for a core city and pass through several large or medium-sized cities within the cluster, or if significant regional network traffic transits the area, HSR may be justified. In such cases, the total volume of passenger traffic should determine whether the line is designed for 250 km/h or 350 km/h service.
It is important to emphasise that passenger transport within large city clusters requires a “door-to-door” approach. Accordingly, overall passenger transport planning must adhere to the principle of “systematisation,” optimising and coordinating the integration of HSR, conventional railways, expressways and various levels of roads, subways, light rail, buses, and transfer stations at both spatial and temporal levels. From the perspective of the guiding philosophy, “systemic thinking” must take precedence over “goal-oriented thinking.” The pursuit of a single transport mode system within large city clusters should be resisted.
In recent years, the media have vigorously promoted the establishment of a “rail-based Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei city cluster.” However, the specific requirements, standards, and implications behind this slogan have not been carefully examined. Perhaps encouraged by this trend, since 2024, media coverage has increasingly emphasised the development of a “rail-based Greater Bay Area” and a “one-hour living circle” within the region. Yet such slogans risk causing misunderstandings and may lead to large-scale, redundant construction. If the projects merely involve short-distance, lower-grade conventional railway branches or suburban light rail lines, this would not be problematic. Otherwise, the implications could be far more serious.
(2) Basic requirements for HSR planning and construction
The above characteristics and planning principles make clear the following: high-speed rail entails heavy investment and high maintenance costs; its development must be backed by substantial passenger demand; and its construction must follow a systematic approach, taking account of the entire transportation network and regional transit systems.
China ranks first in the world in both passenger and freight volume. HSR serves as the backbone of the nation’s land transport system. As previously noted, its primary role is to link major passenger hubs—large and mega cities, as well as urban clusters—underscoring its “prestigious” and “high-end” character. It is not designed for “door-to-door” service. Must such a basic fact still be reiterated? I should think not. Yet in today’s world, it is often the most obvious truths that are the easiest to overlook. It is said that the total length of blood vessels in the human body is about 96,000 km, while the abdominal and thoracic aorta measures only around 20 centimetres. Though the analogy may not be exact, it serves to make the point.
Without adequate passenger demand, the construction of HSR is simply a waste. According to online sources, official standards stipulate that 350 km/h operation is only permitted under two specific conditions: first, when both terminal stations demonstrate annual passenger throughput exceeding 25 million travellers, with medium- to long-distance journeys accounting for at least 70 percent of total ridership; second, for routes handling 20 million annual passengers that serve critical functions within the national railway network. For other routes that do not meet these criteria, the construction of HSR lines with a 350 km/h operation speed is not permitted.
Although HSR entails significant capital investment and ongoing maintenance costs, it should only accounts for a small share of China’s total passenger turnover. The majority of land-based passenger transport is undertaken by conventional railway systems, highway networks, and urban public transportation infrastructure. Of course, conventional railways themselves operate across multiple different classes and infrastructure levels based on passenger traffic volume—single or double track, different traction power (electrified, diesel, or steam-powered), as well as varying station capacities for train marshalling and maintenance operations. Similarly, China’s highway system encompasses multiple hierarchies: from high-capacity expressways down to Class I, II, III and IV arterial roads, in addition to various substandard roadways.
Passenger transport in major cities and their surrounding areas—including the central city and nearby small and medium-sized cities and rural areas with significant commuter flows—should, and indeed must, be handled by an integrated transport system combining metro lines, incoming intercity rail (including HSR), and surface transit such as buses and light rail. Such integration provides the most efficient and practical means of delivering truly “door-to-door” service.
In urban settings—whether in major cities, megacities, or city clusters comprising core cities and their satellite communities—passenger transport is invariably carried out through a coordinated, multimodal system. This integrated approach forms a well-designed, efficiently connected network for short-distance rapid transit. To suggest using HSR for such urban transport needs would be both unrealistic and utterly absurd.
Government authorities and media alike tend to highlight the completion of large-scale intercity transport projects, presenting them as major accomplishments. However, far less attention has been paid to achieving seamless connectivity within major cities, megacities, and their satellite communities, particularly the integration of subways, surface transit (including light rail, buses, and trams), and long-distance railway terminals. Yet this is precisely what matters most to the general public. Regrettably, this vital issue continues to be neglected in China.
Policy pronouncements calling for “HSR access for all prefecture-level cities” [There are 293 prefecture-level cities in China, Translator’s note] and “expressway access for every county” lack a sound scientific basis. Many prefecture-level cities were already well served by conventional rail and highway networks before the advent of HSR. Why insist on HSR coverage? Numerous countries in Europe and North America have no HSR systems, yet are widely regarded as modern and well-connected. Blanketing the country with “prestigious” HSR lines—and treating them as casually as buses—risks turning national planning into a farce. Indeed, consequences are already emerging along sections of the “eight-vertical, eight-horizontal” network (to be discussed further below).
From my observation, the design philosophy behind many transportation projects, HSR included, prioritises “advance planning” with requirements such as “ensuring design capacity for the next 30 years” (likely an informal industry policy). Yet little attention is paid to what actual passenger and freight volumes these regions will face three decades down the line. Due to limited vision and constraints in technical expertise, reliable scientific forecasts are rarely achievable. This has been a key factor driving the “Great Leap Forward” and the overexpansion of China’s HSR network over the past two decades.
Particularly among relevant authorities and some local officials at the prefectural and county levels, there is a widespread tendency to dismiss conventional railways, some not even bothering to consider them. HSR is proposed even where it is unnecessary; where 250 km/h would suffice, a demand is made for 350 km/h instead. In some cases, parallel high-speed lines are put forward based on dubious justifications. Can these authorities offer a clear and concrete rationale? I believe not. It’s like a child’s game of make-believe—devoid of reason.
Some may not be aware that during the first fifty years of the People’s Republic of China, the construction and management of the railway system achieved remarkable progress. Starting from a dilapidated network of just 21,000 km in 1949, the system expanded to 26,300 km by the end of the 1st Five-Year Plan in 1957, and reached 51,700 km by the early 1980s. During this period, key trunk lines such as the Beijing–Shanghai, Beijing–Guangzhou, Beijing–Harbin, and the eastern section of the Lanzhou-Lianyungang line were upgraded through double-tracking, electrification, and the adoption of automated train marshalling technology.
The construction of heavy-haul rail corridors such as the Datong-Qinhuangdao and Shuozhou-Huanghua lines—dedicated to coal transport—effectively resolved long-standing logistics bottlenecks, particularly for Shanxi’s coal exports and north–to-south coal distribution. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Tianjin–Pukou line alone carried 50 million tons of freight annually and operated over forty pairs of daily passenger trains—including express, regular, and slow services—linking eastern China (Shanghai, Nanjing, Zhejiang, Fujian, Anhui, and parts of Jiangxi) with the north, northwest, northeast China, and Shandong Province.
China also ranked among the world’s best in the quality of subgrade and trackbed construction, as well as ballast laying and maintenance. On the Beijing–Tianjin corridor, a train passed every seven minutes. The national railway timetable and its logistical organisation were likewise highly advanced. While today’s rail operations feature more sophisticated logistics systems, it is worth noting that express services on conventional rail lines remain the most popular, the most heavily used, and the most revenue-generating segment of the network.
IV. What challenges has China’s HSR brought?
(1) How did